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Image and venue as factors mediating
latent spillover pressure for
agenda-setting change
Paul J. Stephenson
ABSTRACT Agenda-setting in the EU has been largely approached using litera-
ture from US scholars that emerged over the last 35 years. Surprisingly perhaps,
grand theory in European integration has been ignored, even though it might
offer valuable insights for longitudinal studies, particularly where issues have had dif-
ficulty making it onto the policy agenda. This article seeks to reconcile neofunction-
alist and agenda-setting literature, to trace the journey towards agenda-setting, a
process through which venues and images play a crucial role over time in framing
competing issues. It puts forward a combined framework for analysing agenda-
setting dynamics, before applying it to examine a policy case over five decades.
Tracing the ‘issue career’ of Community rail infrastructure upwards onto the EU’s
policy agenda, it shows how strategies to gain attention and build credibility
mediate latent spillover pressures in order to secure agenda-setting change.
KEY WORDS Agenda-setting; image; neofunctionalism; rail transport; spillover;
venue.
INTRODUCTION
Some 35 years of agenda-setting literature from American scholars of public
policy have provided the concepts of ‘policy streams’ and ‘windows of opportu-
nity’ (Kingdon 1984), the importance of ‘policy images’ and ‘institutional
venues’ (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1993, 2002) and the notion of ‘issue
careers’ (Cobb et al. 1976). The literature which is applied to EU policy-
making is, however, in its relative infancy. Significant research has been made
in the last five years by scholars of the EU with policy cases on bioterrorism,
anti-smoking policy, health care, alcoholism and fisheries, seeking to account
for the forces at play in influencing the degree of attention that issues receive
(Princen 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011; Princen and Rhinard 2006). Despite
Peters’ (1996) and Pollack’s (1997) contributions to the debate on agenda-
setting, the literature is scant compared with EU decision-making.
It seems odd that little regard has been given to grand theory when analysing
agenda-setting in common policy-making. Theoretical approaches to agenda-
setting in EU policy analysis have ignored neofunctionalism (Haas 1958,
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1975; Lindberg 1963). This may simply be because it was considered defunct
when US public policy scholars worked on agenda-setting. More likely,
however, American public policy scholars who initiated the agenda-setting lit-
erature were looking at US politics, not the EC. Arguably, neofunctionalism
was considered useful for trying to explain the dynamics of the regional inte-
gration process and institution building, but ignored as a tool for actual
policy analysis.
Neofunctionalism is highly relevant to the study of agenda-setting in the EU,
after all ‘integration’ is nothing more than the cumulative build-up of successful
agenda-setting at the supranational level – the composite of thousands of issues
being consecutively and – often in parallel – propelled onto the table of policy-
makers, to be later decided upon. Various types of pressure influence the direc-
tion of the policy agenda, yet by itself, spillover fails to account for what actually
determines attention-shift in agendas. Pressure for spillover builds up, but needs
to be triggered; it is thus latent – concealed, inactive, lying dormant or hidden
until circumstances are suitable for its manifestation, or ‘release’. These circum-
stances may depend on venues and images (frames) used by policy actors in their
attempt to ‘sculpt’ an issue to help it reach the policy agenda; these factors may
‘mediate’ (or encourage) the release of spillover pressures.
This article proposes to make a key theoretical point by reconciling the two
sets of literature from integration theory and public policy. It seeks to identify
how venue and image might articulate spillover pressures, enabling an issue –
through several ‘career stages’ – to journey up the political agenda. Equally,
it shows how venue and image strategies may be unconvincing, and why,
despite the build up of certain pressures, spillover may not occur. While spil-
lover is the key focus here, the case touches upon other neofunctionalist con-
siderations such as automacity and politicization.
With the issue of co-ordinated European rail transport as a longitudinal case
study over 50 years, the article analyses how an issue can struggle for attention
over time. Rail transport would seem a highly likely case for early integration,
both because transport policy was included in the Treaty of Rome (along
with agriculture) and because – given the EU’s beginnings with coal and
steel – one would expect rail transport to have been a prime sector subject to
spillover effects from integration efforts elsewhere. Peterson (1991: 274)
asserts the case for functional spillover in that, ‘common policies in highly tech-
nical, non-controversial sectors would require common policies in other areas
due to technical pressures’. The convergence of political perceptions would
produce policy inducing a more complex pattern of trans-national sectoral
activity. Why, then, did it take so long for a European rail policy with the
co-ordinated planning of infrastructures to develop? One might argue that
the case is an example of chronic agenda-setting failure come good, demonstrat-
ing how the development of common infrastructures and an interoperable
European rail network was constrained by a staid and highly technical EC trans-
port policy, only making progress thanks to the configuration of authoritative
venues and convincing images at a later stage.
Paul J. Stephenson: Latent spillover pressure 797
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The second section of this article considers the classic theoretical literature
into agenda-setting to date, to see how European integration theory may actu-
ally compliment the public policy concepts (and vice versa), to allow for a more
nuanced understanding of agenda-setting dynamics. The third section builds a
refined framework for analysing agenda-setting over time. The fourth section
then uses it to analyse the case of European railways over five decades, to
examine what the case can tell us about venue and image vis-a`-vis spillover,
and our understanding of the dynamics behind agenda-setting change.
RECONCILING THEORETICAL INSIGHTS INTO AGENDA-
SETTING
European public policy
Issue careers
Why certain issues end up as topics for European Union policy-making, while
others do not, is uncertain (Princen and Rhinard 2006). What makes a
‘concern’ legitimate enough for it to be recognized as an ‘issue’ that warrants
policy action at the supranational level? Many proposals are floated but only
a small proportion makes it high up the political agenda, influenced by the pol-
itical climate or ‘events’. A whole set of political and non-political factors may
account for the rise and fall of issues – a process during which policy actors form
coalitions, which in turn frame issues; they are never just ‘on’ or ‘off’ the agenda,
but receive little, some, or lots of attention (Princen 2007: 23). Downs (1972)
refers to ‘issue-attention cycles’. Kingdon (1984) distinguishes between ‘govern-
mental agendas’ issues that receive attention, and ‘decision agendas’ where pol-
itical action must be taken. An issue’s ‘agenda-setting attributes’ may help
explain shifts in attention and policy responses (Green-Pedersen and Wilkerson
2006: 1040). Cobb et al. (1976) distinguish between three types of agenda
dynamics, depending on where an issue emanates from, and how it becomes rel-
evant to other agendas: in the ‘outside initiative’ external issues become political
and are set on the ‘formal’ agenda; in the ‘mobilization model’ political
initiators try to sell an issue to a wider public; and with ‘inside access’ issues
born of internal decision-makers never actually make it outside (Princen and
Rhinard 2006: 1120). Caporaso and Keeler (1995) distinguish between ‘high
politics’ issues dictated from above, and ‘low politics’ issues fed upwards.
How to conceive of issue development over time? Hogwood and Gunn
(1984) refer to the three stages of issue ‘search’, ‘filtration’ and ‘definition’,
while Cobb et al. (1976) recognize four stages in an issue’s career: ‘initiation’,
‘specification’, ‘expansion’ and ‘entrance’. An issue may be ‘initiated’ as high
politics by being placed on an agenda by a top official, but interest may wane
or the issue’s urgency go unrecognized. Thereafter, it may be left to low-level
officials to ‘specify’ the issue over many years, hammering out technical
elements. An issue may ‘expand’ by travelling up slowly to higher political
levels, only ‘entering’ once it has gained access to the formal agenda. A low
798 Journal of European Public Policy
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politics route implies a long-term, incremental and self-sustaining dynamic
whereby there is, suddenly, no ignoring the issue – a ‘point of no return’
(Princen and Rhinard 2006: 1122).
Timing and sequence
Time, planning and policy-making form a complex triangular relationship
(Schneider 1991). One should not conceive of agenda-setting as a phenomenon
that occurs over night, but over an extended time period. Kingdon (1984) asserts
that actor participation varies in different issue areas over time and depends on a
convergence of multiple elements (problems, policies and politics), each with its
own dynamics. Long time frames help explain the ‘rise and fall’ of issues and the
‘punctuated’ way in which policy-making proceeds (Pralle 2006: 987). Jolts to
the process, in the form of external shocks, such as a ‘focusing event’, including
a crisis or disaster, bring about shifts in authority, or the mobilization of new
interests to an issue (Pralle 2006: 989); pushing an issue up the agenda
depends on how well interests and institutions are organized, the balance of
power and distribution of resources, plus the ability to secure interest in it.
Timing provides strategic opportunities to ‘venue shop’ – to identify an
ambitious or empowered institution where the issue can be ‘homed’, nurtured,
groomed, i.e. a place where politicians and interests groups are sympathetic or
disposed to the issue, perhaps who harbour an ambitious political vision, or are
promoting a programme that can ‘accommodate’ it. As Princen (2007: 12)
points out, a key feature of the focus on venues is that it enables one to look
for moments of ‘issue internationalization’, i.e. where national collective
action problems can become international (Community) ones.
Images and venues
Baumgartner and Jones’ (1991, 1993, 2002) theory of ‘venue shopping’ was
built on the premise that policy change is secured when policy actors are able
to shift debates and decisions on an issue to new or modified venues, which
enables the issue to be approached from different angles; the original venue
may have effectively monopolized how it was treated politically, even
straight-jacketing it to prevent agenda-setting change. In the EU issues are dis-
cussed by many institutions and organizations at the supranational level, but few
(Council and EP) have the prerogative of decision-making. Image is crucial, not
only in the media, but for attention-shift politics and policy-making. As Baum-
gartner and Jones (1993: 25) assert, ‘policy images play a critical role in the
expansion of issues to the previously apathetic [policy actors and institutions]’.
Specialists (as opposed to generalists) choose ways to communicate the issue in
simplified and symbolic terms. The images chosen to refer to the issue will
depend on the favoured policy focus; the issue will be ‘given’ certain social
and political implications, though not all policy actors will recognize or agree
with them. Thus, with policy images made up of a blend of empirical infor-
mation and emotive/evaluative appeals (both subtle and strong) ‘tone’ can cri-
tically determine how an issue develops (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 26). The
Paul J. Stephenson: Latent spillover pressure 799
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dynamics of (incremental or rapid) change depends on the strategies employed
by political, social, business or media ‘image-makers’, who largely determine
how and when the issue is received by policy-makers. Figure 1 consolidates
various typologies concerning strategy, as recently developed by Princen
(2011), after Baumgartner and Jones (1993), to show what we seek to identify
when examining venues and images up close, and how they are used to gain
attention and build credibility.
European integration studies
Grand theory
Given that the Commission has long been the official agenda-setter, it seems
highly logical to consider neofunctionalism when examining agenda-setting
change, particularly concerning the incremental and concerted activity of supra-
national elites, even if they do not operate in a vacuum; the agenda-setting
process brings in many more communities of actors (Princen 2007: 23). Incre-
mental decision-taking (over grand designs) results from the unintended conse-
quences of the policy process; precisely, what the functionalists termed ‘latent’ as
opposed to ‘manifest’ outcomes. As Haas (1970: 627) later argued, political
actors are incapable of long-range purposive behaviour, stumbling from one
decision to the next, with imperfect knowledge of the consequences and up
Figure 1 Venue and image strategies in the EU
Source: After Princen (2009, 2011)
800 Journal of European Public Policy
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against deadlines. Second, institutional venues comprise technocrats who facili-
tate – or ‘engineer’ – the (re)framing of an issue previously low on the agenda,
by matching it with one receiving greater attention, thus advocating which
issues merit political attention. Third, venues from horizontal and vertical lin-
kages vary in their institutional power dynamics over time, certainly at the
supranational level. Systemic variables such as power distribution, informational
asymmetry, leadership strength and consensus, all affect the collective ability of
elites to find common ground or reach compromise. Lindberg (1963, 1965)
recognized the value of a shared body of ideas acting as political glue,
binding elites to invest in integration, while Haas (1958) argued that EC mem-
bership transformed interest group and government perceptions of the national
interest. Fourth, integration is accelerated in areas where scientists and tech-
nicians play a key role (Farrell and He´ritier 2005: 275) – and in rail transport,
developing common technology, management and safety specifications is
central to policy integration.
Spillover
Central to neofuntionalist predictions was the principle of ‘spillover’ or ‘engre-
nage’. Policy integration would intensify and expand through the policy process,
arising from a number of causal variables: political spillover (the exertion of inte-
grative pressures by national elites and the socialization of national civil servants
at a supranational level), functional spillover (the assurance of original goals
through further integrative action) and cultivated spillover (the exertion of
integrative pressures by Community institutions, be it through institutional
self-interest). Spillover was seen as a dynamic of integration, driven by learning
processes, credible commitments and the creative cultivation of interests,
themselves evolving through a process of issue framing inside and between
institutional venues.
For spillover to occur, Haas (1958) believed issues need to be first depoliti-
cized and characterized by pragmatic interest politics, while Schmitter (1969,
1970) held that politicization was in fact the necessary driving force since the
controversy of joint-decision-making would attract wider groups. A decade
after Haas, Schmitter (1969: 1962) already observed how the process of
integration was equally driven by frustration and/or dissatisfaction in the
attainment of collectively agreed goals (perhaps due precisely to the failure
of pragmatic interest politics), which actually pushed elites to collaborate
in relating sectors or find new ways to secure intensified commitment in the
existing sectors.
As Niemann and Schmitter (2009: 56) assert, functional spillover depends on
perceptions. Actors must believe that ‘functional structure’ – i.e. the configur-
ation and qualification of policy-making institutions – is ‘plausible’. Functional
pressures must be seen to be compelling. In this respect, elites act as agents selling
necessity, urgency, compulsion and translating pressures into something persua-
sive by flagging up issue salience, interdependence and constraint (Niemann and
Paul J. Stephenson: Latent spillover pressure 801
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Schmitter 2009: 57). In short, there is no automacity to the expansive logic of
integration, but rather much depends on purposive behaviour and communi-
cation.
Where spillover does not occur, ‘latent spillover pressure’ may build up.
There may be failure over time to secure the entrance of an issue onto the
higher echelons of the policy agenda – perhaps due to unconvincing percep-
tions of the issue, or weak institutions – but successful spillover in other
sectors. An analogy would be a reservoir that fills up creating pressure on the
dam walls. Given exogenous factors, including changes in the economic
climate or wider integration project, functional spillover pressure for action
may be pent up, even increasing, until released – though such release is not
guaranteed.
TOWARDS A COMBINED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING
AGENDA-SETTING OVER TIME?
Neofunctionalist spillover can add value to public policy concepts such as
‘image’ and ‘venue’ because of its emphasis on ‘perception’ and ‘structure’,
and vice versa. Both literatures recognize similar features of the process, but neo-
functionalism’s focus on elite behaviour implicitly suggests how – through con-
sensus, learning and interest – images and venues might be used, i.e. they
articulate and accommodate elite behaviour. Neofunctionalism is helpful in
conceiving of a general build-up of pressure in a certain direction, while
agenda-setting theory provides factors to explain the articulation of this pressure
– two essential constructive elements or ‘jigsaw pieces’ that help illustrate
how spillover is mediated; venues/images combine in a dynamic process of
interaction and transformation to ‘put flesh on spillover’s bones’.
Policy actors with vested interests forge an impression that policy action is
necessary. One might even go as far as to argue that latent spillover pressure
only exists insofar as policy actors advocate taking further steps, having
usually identified possibilities for action (pitched as solutions), i.e. venues
and images are used to make decision-makers feel the pressure for new
decisions. In so doing, even the projection of images and messages – the
mere talk of action – may be considered a form of latent pressure, thus tempt-
ing or provoking incremental change in a desired direction.
Figure 2 offers a combined framework for conceiving of mediating factors in
agenda-setting that marries Princen’s (2011) typologies of agenda-setting strat-
egies (in the double-lined box) – after Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) notions
of venue and image – with Haas’ (1958, 1970, 1975) notion of neofunctionalist
spillover. The framework might be conceived of metaphorically as a sandwich –
one made from two slices of spillover bread with a ‘nutritious’ filling of venues and
images, i.e., as a dynamic by which venues and images mediate the build-up and
potential release of latent pressures for policy integration, determining whether
or not spillovers occur. It suggests that both venue/image strategies need to be
timely and targeted: venue – conducive and appropriate; image – convincing
802 Journal of European Public Policy
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and appealing. It raises the question whether both a successful venue and image
strategy are needed, or if one will suffice to secure an issue’s access to the agenda?
The two are interwoven, however, since agenda-setters produce images/frames
and target venues simultaneously. Ipso facto, an issue’s failure to climb up the
policy agendamay be precisely because one of these two elements is unsatisfactory,
i.e. for venues, when sufficient support is not mobilized or capacity built, and
for images/frames when the necessary interest is not aroused or authority
claimed convincingly.
A combination of effective image/venue strategies may secure faster access up
the policy agenda, encouraging policy formulation and decision. However,
agenda access is not tantamount to spillover; strictly speaking, only if issue
‘entrance’ leads to some form of decision (often usually legally binding commit-
ment) for collective action does policy integration occur. In some cases, venue/
image strategies may succeed in securing access high up the policy agenda, but
decisions may be stalled or blocked, and the issue hijacked by other policy entre-
preneurs (Princen and Rhinard 2006: 1122).
Figure 2 How venue and image mediate spillover
Paul J. Stephenson: Latent spillover pressure 803
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CASE: THE ‘ISSUE CAREER’ OF EUROPEAN RAIL TRANSPORT
Neofunctionalist expectations
The neofunctionalists would have expected the ‘expansive logic of sector inte-
gration’ (Haas 1958: 283) to apply to transport, extending supranational insti-
tutional capabilities for the co-ordinated development of pan-European rail
infrastructure, and cementing the ‘four freedoms’ of movement of persons,
goods and services, capital and labour. Policy integration in and between sectors
implied partnerships between Commission actors, interest groups and national
officials. Steel was the heart of EC industry, playing a key role in establishing the
European institutions (Dudley and Richardson 1997). It was thus not inconceiva-
ble for integration to extend from coal and steel to railways, since these resources
(literally) fuelled train operations. Transporting coal and steel across borders
would also rely on interoperable trains, signalling and track; and policy-makers
would recognize that policy integration could stimulate intra-Community trade.
Scholars such as Trench (1963), Caporaso (1970) and Button (1993) address
early transport developments in the Common Market, while Abbati (1986),
Whitelegg (1989, 1993), Hamilton, (1990), Ross (1994, 1998) and Tolley
and Turton (1995) analyse the CTP. Nijkamp (1993) and Vickerman (1994)
focus on high-speed rail development, while Stevens (2004) examines policy-
making in EU transport. Johnson and Turner (1997, 2007) take a political
economy perspective on trans-European networks (TENs) in transport, tele-
coms and energy.
Issue initiation (1945–1957)
Venue-mobilizing support
After the destruction of war there was little support mobilized for co-ordinated
rail planning and, unsurprisingly, even resistance to the notion of foreign trains
on domestic soil, hence an absence of venues and political mistrust of
co-operation in pan-European transport. The European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) (1951) sought to manage and control primary resources,
not manufacture railways. The ECSC Treaty appealed to prevailing values in
terms of establishing ‘common bases for economic development’, but focused
on non-controversial, ‘practical achievements’ in the short-term. According to
Milward (1984: 494) it was the ECSC’s extra-nationality, rather than its
supra-nationality which gave it its integrative potential, since functional tasks
could be achieved in a forum outside of, but not necessarily above the nation-
state. The Treaty’s regulatory framework did abolish quantitative restrictions
on coal and steel movement, such as import/export duties (Article 4).
Venue-building capacity
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE) (1947),
with its inland transport committee, was the principal international institutional
arena for rail until the founding of the European Conference of Ministers of
804 Journal of European Public Policy
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Transport (ECMT) in 1953 and Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development in 1961. The ECMTmet twice a year, publishing regular research
reports on infrastructure improvement that encouraged the rational develop-
ment of key inland rail links. The Community institutions – the High Auth-
ority in 1951 as the executive of the ECSC and its counterbalance, the
Special Council of Ministers (the forerunner of the Council of Ministers), as
well as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and European Parliament, both
in 1952 – were in their infancy, with significant internal capacity-building
and inter-institutional relationships still to forge. UN-ECE later established
ties with the European Economic Community (EEC) a decade later in 1957,
particularly the Commission (Treaty of Rome Article 229).
Image-arousing interest
European states deepened their entrenched stances regarding transport regu-
lation, ownership and financing, preoccupied with the replacement and repair
of vital national rail infrastructures, and by 1949 Europe was ‘back on its
feet’ thanks to initial high rates of investment in fixed capital (Milward 1984:
482). As Wallace et al. (1983: 58) claim, national infrastructures were rebuilt
without any support for the development of appropriate cross-border com-
munication channels; planning was in and about the national self-interest.
National governments imposed licensing conditions, controlling competition
and providing piecemeal investment in domestic railways (Button 1993: 222).
Why was transport included in The Treaty of Rome, alongside agriculture?
Because the political imperative was to create a single market. Transport was
seen as a key to enabling the free movement of goods, services, capital and
labour. Article 75 of the Treaty of Rome (now Article 95 of the TFEU)
formed the legal basis of the Common Transport Policy (CTP), stating inter
alia that the Council shall ‘lay down: common rules applicable to international
transport’ and ‘the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate’,
‘measures to improve transport safety’ and ‘any other appropriate provisions’. In
short, if attention was drawn to the transport issue it was for a single market for
services, to be achieved by opening up market access, but precluding any notion
of developing a common network of international infrastructures.
Image-claiming authority
Authority lay not with political bodies but technical and sectoral ones, including
organizations for maritime, air and rail transport, the most significant for terres-
trial rail being the International Union of Railways (IUR), established in 1922
(Ross 1998: 46). There was ample technical and planning expertise but spread
across myriad international bodies, all seeking to assert themselves as experts,
but with no political powers. Community law supposedly provided that auth-
ority: the Treaty of Rome asserted that, subject to the provisions within, ‘trans-
port policy [. . .] shall continue to be governed by the laws or regulations of the
individual member states, as shall measures relating to co-ordination and com-
petition between different modes of transport or different routes’ (ECSC 1952,
Paul J. Stephenson: Latent spillover pressure 805
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Chapter 9, Article 70). Community objectives would be ‘pursued by Member
States within the framework of a CTP’ (Article 74).
Issue specification (1958–1980)
Venue-mobilizing support
The Commission (1961) sought to mobilize the Community with a first action
programme on transport. Such opportunistic issue promotion was constrained
by the Council where unanimity was required. Only in 1976 did the Commis-
sion eventually establish a Committee for Transport Infrastructures (CTI), with
a remit to consult member states in order to develop transport questions of
‘Community interest’ (Council 1978), including the creation of new links,
removal of ‘bottlenecks’, increase in rail capacity and development of cross-
border routes. It consulted the CTI before submitting three-yearly reports to
the Council and EP (Johnson and Turner 1997: 9–12). A new venue was estab-
lished with the European Investment Bank (EIB) in 1958 to loan funds to
national governments to build infrastructures.
Venue-building capacity
The Council of Ministers adopted the CEMT’s network plan in 1965, but
minimal progress resulted due to an inability to translate proposals into concrete
measures, a lack of internal consensus and the Commission’s weak institutional
power. DG Transport [VII], then an institutional backwater, reported to the
EP’s transport committee. It sought horizontal support from European railways
bodies – networks of professionals with recognized competences in rail plan-
ning. Only in 1978 did the EP finally express concern over Council foot-drag-
ging on a CTP (Hamilton 1990: 16). DG Transport began building up its
informational resources, drawing on research produced by a burgeoning episte-
mic community of rail experts and academics, including CEMT and UN-ECE.
From the early 1970s, the IUR developed its own permutations of a cross-
border rail network with a range of investment scenarios – a bold vision offering
a blueprint for a pan-European rail network.
Image-arousing interest
The inauguration of the Trans European Express (Europe’s first inter-city rail ser-
vices) captured the imagination in 1957 by introducing interoperable rolling
stock, and consequently much attention was paid in the first decade of the
EEC to deregulating freight and passenger services. At the outset of the EEC,
the farming lobby aroused huge political and social interest with its emotive
appeals to ensure basic food supply and prevent hunger. With its human dimen-
sion, agriculture was perceived as ‘urgent’. Rail transport had to compete for
interest but also cope with its perceived image as complex and highly technical;
it would remain isolated, sealed off or ‘encapsulated’ within Community policy-
making for another decade (Caporaso 1970: 366).
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Member States showed scant interest in the Schaus Memorandum, which
presented first guidelines for a Community-wide action programme in transport
(Commission 1961; Giorgi and Schmidt 2002), but steps towards co-ordinated
rail construction were approved in 1969, obliging member states to provide
technical route descriptions, expenditure estimates and work schedules
(Johnson and Turner 1997: 7). Political interest was nonetheless weak; the
CEMT/Commission’s 1974 blueprint for a network of rail arteries, to be
expanded as the Community developed, was ignored in Council committees
(COM(73)1725 final). Decisions were overturned while meetings failed to
address wider, long-term issues (Wallace et al. 1983: 403–24). Transport
Policy (CTP) remained patchy, incremental and sporadic. The common pol-
itical interest was to pursue national policies and ‘keep transport down’.
The Commission tried to arouse the member states’ interest by repeatedly
presenting ‘packages’ of proposals in the hope of reaching compromise in the
Council through mutual concessions. Practically speaking, it was left to
monitor national rail investment priorities, consult member states widely and
fine parties who refused to disclose national transport rules. As Stevens (2004:
54) asserts, the Dutch Presidency in the first half of 1981 saw so little point
in the many proposals, and so little prospect of making any progress towards
the type of transport policy it sought, that it actually cancelled both Council
meetings in the first half of 1981.
Image-claiming authority
While EECmembers had signed up to a commonmarket, in no explicit terms did
they perceive rail as an instrument for market integration. The Treaty referred
opaquely to the ‘distinctive features of transport’ (Article 75). Transport was a
‘secondary’ sector, dragged forward incrementally to keep up with lowest
common policy advances in other sectors (Caporaso 1970: 370). Why exactly?
Ross (1998: 45) claims that the Treaty’s ‘innocuous’ wording shrouded the
obvious functional link between transport and market integration. Purposeful
ambiguity undermined subsequent Commission attempts to set the agenda for
transport infrastructure (Trench 1963) – it still lacked the policy-making auth-
ority.What wasmissing was the effective issue linkage with economic growth and
regional development. By the late 1970s, theCTP – which ignored infrastructure
completely – was ‘an ineffective policy, pursued in an indifferent manner, based
on simplistic economic notions’ (Tolley and Turton 1995; Whitelegg 1989,
1993). In the late 1970s, the Commission urged the provision of vital Commu-
nity aid to fund rail construction projects, to guard against long-term losses in the
integration process (COM(79)550 final).
Issue expansion (1981–1988)
Venue-mobilizing support
Finally, in March 1981 the Council backed a Commission proposal for infra-
structure investment to facilitate cross-border movements (Council 1981;
Paul J. Stephenson: Latent spillover pressure 807
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Hamilton 1990: 16). But in 1983, in an unprecedented action, the EP took the
Council to the ECJ for failure to deliver a CTP; the deadline, as laid down in the
Treaty, had been December 1969. The May 1985 judgement on Case 13/83
ruled that, although original references to the CTP in the Treaty were vague,
it had nonetheless been infringed. This supranational legal venue was crucial
for forging political support in the Council, giving the Commission room to
manoeuvre. In terms of venues, this was an ‘inside initiative’ insofar as it was
internal to the process, and was deliberately brought about by one of the
EC’s institutional actors. Why did the EP decide to go to the ECJ, and why
at this time? With direct elections in 1979, the EP was seeking to flex its
muscle – it was frustrated and lacked influence, ‘casting about for a means to
break the logjam’ (Stevens 2004: 54–5). The constellation of actors was propi-
tious: in the summer of 1981 there was a new Director-General of Transport
(Steele), while the Parliament’s rapporteur and his relevant director in the Com-
mission were both Italian (common culture and language); hence DG Trans-
port persuaded the EP to focus its attack on the Council (Stevens 2004: 55).
At a Council meeting soon after the judgement, the German Minister appealed
to colleagues, insisting that never again should they be condemned in such a way
(He´ritier and Knill 2001: 53; in Stevens 2004: 55–6).
Moreover, by this time the European business community was well mobi-
lized. In 1985, 471 out of 654 Brussels-based interest associations were indus-
try-related or commerce-oriented (Streeck and Schmitter 1991: 137). European
technology had producers and consumers formed unified, pan-European
pressure groups. The Commission became the ‘arbiter’ of varied, conflicting,
yet converging interests (Ross 1998: 28). The European Round Table of Indus-
trialists (ERT), established in 1983, exerted a crucial influence and showed
‘outside initiative’: some 45 CEOs from large European firms, including
high-speed train constructors and rail operators, grabbed the attention of politi-
cal actors, stressing the Community’s (potentially adverse) economic future, if
no action were taken in the countdown to ‘1992’. Support was also sought
from new venues: the Community of European Railways (1988) emerged as
an independent group of the IUR, which, with the Union of European
Railway Industries, began to organize the Eurailspeed congress – landmark
occasions for the European rail industry and policy-making technocrats to
mobilize, socialize and strengthen.
Venue-building capacity
Inside the EC institutions, the renewed confidence of DGs Transport (DGVII),
Energy (DGXVII) and Telecommunications (DGXIII) (Whitelegg 1993: 157)
initiated policy proposals. The Commission was entrepreneurial in pushing
trans-national rail issues and increasingly successful at getting technology propo-
sals (for example, the 4th and 5th Framework Programmes) adopted by the
Council (Schneider et al. 1994: 475). This was done by internal re-organization
and through strong leadership. Jacques Delors, Commission President from
January 1985, fervently supported greater liberalization and harmonization,
808 Journal of European Public Policy
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competition and non-discrimination. As Ross (1994: 193) asserts ‘. . .“his”
Commission assumed a much more activist stance on high-speed rail planning,
development and funding’. For further insight into Commission entrepreneur-
ship in this area, see Stephenson (2010).
Image-arousing interest
Delors referred to the need for ‘thinking big’ and being ‘far-sighted’ while
‘taking account of world-wide geopolitical and economic trends’ (Delors
1988, 1989). The Commission became more convincing in its language and
developed a better technical grasp of the ‘multiplicity of issues involved, and
had no lack of ideas about how to tackle them’ (Ross 1998: 53), heeding to
calls by Brussels-based industry to liberalize, deregulate and abolish barriers –
the Kangaroo Club of 1981 had desired to ‘hop over barriers’ to secure trade
gains. This was echoed in the business community’s own publications, which
used the analogy of ‘missing links’ to argue for new rail infrastructures within
EC transport policy (ERT 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991). The European
Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) lobby recognized ‘inefficiencies in the
decision-making process’ (complexity, insufficient participation and postpone-
ment) and an ‘ineffective planning process’ (lack of a system approach and lack
of a European-level body) as barriers to issue expansion (Umbach 1990:
28–30). In 1986, the Commission sought to attract interest in a medium-
term vision for high-speed rail, aimed at boosting competitiveness
(COM(86)340 final), just as Spain and Portugal’s accession focused attention
on the issue, given significant disparities in infrastructural provision and the
existence of different rail gauge widths.
Image-claiming authority
The timing of the ECJ’s decision, on the eve of the SEA, was crucial for ‘eco-
nomicizing’ rail transport towards competition and internal market. The Com-
mission learnt to convey the trans-national nature of Community transport
better. The explicit link to infrastructure development gave the CTP a
spatial/structural dimension. As Ross (1998: xii) maintains, transport became
horizontally integrated with other policy areas – regional policy, environment,
competition, energy, enlargement, budget, R&D and information society: ‘it
had its finger in nearly every EU pie’. Through policy synergies, transport
emerged as ‘a fulcrum around which other policy areas increasingly revolved[d],
both functionally and in a policymaking sense’ (Ross 1998: 11–12). The 1984
white paper (Cockfield report) recognized physical and technical barriers to
integration, yet its proposals were fiscal and concerned cross-border business
and tax harmonization – co-ordinated infrastructure planning was not
deemed ‘an essential element’ (COM(85)310, paragraph 112). But the 1988
Cecchini report, predicting a one-off net increase in total EC growth of 5 per
cent by removing market obstacles (SEC(88)524 final), did later give an intel-
lectual authority to arguments that transport-related ills threatened market
Paul J. Stephenson: Latent spillover pressure 809
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integration, justifying DG Transport’s (VII) proposal for an action programme
for rail infrastructure investment (COM(88)340).
Issue entrance (1989–1996)
Venue-mobilizing support
Calling for a Transport Infrastructure Policy ((COM(89)238); Community
of European Railways 1989), and ‘Community Action Programme’
(COM(90)585) for TENs, the Commission headed up a new institutional
arena – a high-level working group, composed of member state representatives
and led by commissioners for transport (Kinnock) and internal market (Chris-
tophersen) (High-Level Group on TENs 1990). Rail transport issues began
attracting more political attention at European summits (Edinburgh, December
1992; Copenhagen, June 1993), eventually securing political decisions (Corfu,
June 1994; Essen, December 1994).
Venue-building capacity
Following a ‘Declaration of European Interest’ to help establish TENs
(COM(92)15) – subsequently given legal status at Maastricht (Article 129b-
d TEU, now Articles 170–172 TFEU), the Commission looked to the
future, building capacity for implementation by creating a separate TEN-T
budget, financial regulation (1995) and guidelines for member states (1996).
It worked closely with the EIB on loan provision – experimenting with
private–public partnerships relatively unsuccessfully (Turro´ 1999) – and
used new information technology to improve data exchange, communication
with, and monitoring of, national transport ministries.
Image-arousing interest
Liberalizing rail transport implied harmonizing traffic management systems,
ensuring technical ‘interoperability’ and promoting non-discrimination; infra-
structure owners across Europe could no longer deny access to non-national rail
operators (Directive 91/400). TENs was embedded within the policy discourse
of ‘1992’, highlighting the causal relationship between infrastructure investment,
and growth and employment (COM(93)700 final). Hence, the pursuit of co-ordi-
nated rail investment was framed using the body metaphor, with high-speed rail
lines as the ‘backbone’ and conventional, secondary routes as the ‘arteries’.
Image-claiming authority
As Schneider et al. (1994: 474) assert, by the early 1990s the European institutions
could no longer be described as ‘passive social environments’ but as ‘active com-
ponents with autonomous action capabilities’, as the neofunctionalists would
expect. The Commission’s DG Transport and DG Internal Market had evolved
into authoritative bodies able to reconcile multiple interests and highlight succes-
sively European rail transport’s link to medium-term political priorities. Figure 3
provides an ‘at-a-glance’ overview of European rail transport’s issue career.
810 Journal of European Public Policy
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The four-stage issue career might be considered: overlooked, suppressed,
entwined and liberated. The rail transport issue showed a long period of speci-
fication followed by a relative short period of expansion when venues and
images proved crucial. In terms of the dynamics for agenda-setting change,
Community rail transport ‘jumped’ the Single Market train – ‘1992’ was the
‘issue engine’ carrying it up the political agenda. The period between the
third and fourth stage of the issue’s career – expansion and issue entrance –
was crucial. Venues and images were finally strong enough to mediate the
latent pressures that had built up (or at least, had been projected to have
done so). Considerable support had been mobilized, adequate capacity built,
sufficient interest aroused; policy proponents could claim sufficient authority
and gain the attention of policy-makers. Timing and sequences were important;
Figure 3 Empirical realities: the issue career of European rail infrastructure
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the likelihood of spillover in the late 1980s was conditioned by the extent of pre-
vious policy expansion, itself partly explained by the degree of competition from
other sectors for issue attention, i.e. the long-term failure of the CTP versus con-
siderable functional and political spillover in agriculture. Thus, an issue’s career
must be understood vis-a`-vis the issue careers of other policy fields; an issue can
‘simmer’ for decades as the hobbyhorse of technocrats, experts and sectoral
bodies, ‘specified’ and ‘expanded’ low down the agenda, only rising up when
the combination of venue and image is conducive.
CONCLUSION
From a public policy perspective the combined framework developed and
applied in this article enables a more insightful and precise explanation of
how agenda-setting, as articulated through the use of venues and images (Baum-
gartner and Jones 1993), can be situated temporally as part of an actor-driven
integration process (Haas 1958). From a European integration studies perspec-
tive, it brings a new understanding to the mechanics behind the dynamics of neo-
functionalist spillover by, first, considering integration as ‘fed’ by the cumulative
build-up of incidences of agenda-setting change, and second, accepting that the
translation/communication of issues into successful calls for collective policy
action depends on perceptions and structures. This is particularly useful
because it offers a practical, systematic and nuanced way to identify how inte-
gration is stimulated (or not) through the lifecycle of issues.
Marrying these concepts in an experimental way offers a means to examine an
issue’s trajectory upwards onto the agenda of Community policy-makers over
time. It helps show that, even beyond the heyday of neofunctionalism, the spil-
lover concept remains highly relevant for the study of contemporary policy-
making, since day-to-day it is via venues and images that institutions learn to
transfer loyalties, shape beliefs, establish linkages and legitimise authority, all
central to Haas’ premises. Moreover, the notion that venues and images are
shopped for and crafted by elites relates directly to the neofunctionalist recog-
nition of elite creativity, entrepreneurship and interest mobilization, as well as
the incremental nature of the process – agenda-setting (and integration) is
dependent on concerted and multifarious action over time.
If venue and image are each important for gaining issue attention and build-
ing issue credibility, is one more crucial than the other when it comes to secur-
ing agenda-setting change? The two are difficult to separate, since venues possess
their own institutional images, either purposively manufactured or purely by
association, owing to the general perception of the issue – as exciting, dull,
boring, complex, etc. Moreover, some venues help lay the ‘groundwork’ for
change, sustaining pressure and momentum in the policy subsystem through
the provision of information, ideas and appeals, which are then used by other
venues in conducive, targeted and creative ways. In short, without venue
there is no support or capacity for elites; without image, elites have no authority
and cannot secure the interest of policy-makers. If communication fails, there is
812 Journal of European Public Policy
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no cognitive processing of the notion that further collective (integrative) action
is desirable.
Analyses of agenda-setting in the EU can benefit from longitudinal micro-
studies of venue and image strategies. The new status given to the European
Council as agenda-setter, as well as national parliamentary scrutiny and civil
society groups post-Lisbon, bring new dynamics to the study of agenda-
setting change, in terms of the interest, authority, support and capacity of
multi-level actors in the EU policy process.
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